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INTRODUCTION 
3D printing is an emerging technology that is moving fast 
from the workshop into the home.  No longer are the rapid 
prototyping and additive manufacturing capabilities of 3D 
printers reserved for engineers and researchers.  Today 
consumers, hobbyists, and technophiles can download a 
computer-aided design or CAD file (a digital representation of 
a physical product) and additively “print” a three-dimensional 
product or component as simply as one can print words to a 
page.1  In 2012, these digital printable items were coined as 
“physibles” by the notorious online piracy website The Pirate 
Bay.2 
This technology has wide-ranging and profound effects on 
intellectual property rights, particularly patents.  Centuries of 
traditional manufacturing processes and commercial 
infrastructure have shaped patent law under the assumption 
that physical goods are traded in physical form.  For example, 
a factory infringes a patent by “making” the patented product, 
a retailer infringes a patent by “selling” the patented product, 
and a purchaser of a product infringes a patent by “using” the 
patented product.3  Because these various acts each constitute 
direct infringement, patent owners are generally able to 
enforce their patents against different entities to extinguish 
any harmful infringement at the source. 
Sometimes it can be difficult or impractical to target a 
direct infringer and extinguish infringement.  Suppose a 
patented machine is only partially assembled (and thus 
noninfringing)4 but is sold across the country to individuals 
 
 1.  For an overview of 3D printing technology, see Daniel H. Brean, Asserting 
Patents to Combat Infringement Via 3D Printing: It’s No “Use,” 23 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 771 *2013).  
 2.  Evolution: New Category, The Pirate Bay (January 23, 2012), 
http://thepiratebay.org/blog/203 (“We believe that the next step in copying will be 
made from digital form into physical form. It will be physical objects. Or as we 
decided to call them: Physibles. Data objects that are able (and feasible) to become 
physical. We believe that things like three dimensional printers, scanners, and 
such are just the first step.”).  
 3.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to 
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the 
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, 
infringes the patent.”).  
 4.  Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 796 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (“To establish infringement of a patent, every limitation set forth in a claim 
must be found in an accused product or process exactly or by a substantial 
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who later assemble the entire machine (and thus infringe).5  
One could sue each individual customer for “making” or “using” 
the device,6 but it is obviously more efficient and effective to 
somehow stop the manufacture of the partially-assembled 
components before they are distributed.  Situations like this 
gave rise to indirect infringement claims—causes of action 
based on providing a component of a patented product or 
actively encouraging others to infringe.7  As the Supreme 
Court has explained, these indirect infringement doctrines 
essentially “provide for the protection of patent rights where 
enforcement against direct infringers is impracticable.”8 
There is a considerable drawback to having to rely on 
indirect theories of infringement, however.  “Direct 
infringement has long been understood to require no more than 
the unauthorized use of a patented invention” by performing 
one of the enumerated activities under Section 271(a).9  In 
other words, direct infringement is a strict liability tort.  
Indirect infringement, by contrast, requires proof of a culpable 
intent—namely, the intent to cause infringement, which 
includes both knowledge of the patent and knowledge that the 
third party direct infringer’s conduct was, in fact, infringing.10  
In practice, this is quite hard to prove, and is generally proven 
only with circumstantial evidence.  For these reasons, patent 
owners almost universally prefer not to rely on indirect 
 
equivalent.”). 
 5.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (providing that “making” an invention constitutes 
infringement);Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913) (“The right to make 
can scarcely be made plainer by definition, and embraces the construction of the 
thing invented.”). 
 6.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to 
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the 
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, 
infringes the patent.”). 
 7.  35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent 
shall be liable as an infringer.”); 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells 
within the United States or imports into the United States a component of a 
patented machine . . . constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the 
same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of 
such patent . . . shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”).  
 8.  Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 511 
(1964) (quoting H.R. 5988, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H.R. 3866, 81st Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1949))  
 9.  Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 n.2 
(2011).  
 10.  Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011); 
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964).  
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infringement theories unless obtaining relief for direct 
infringement is impracticable. 
Between direct and indirect infringement, patent law 
attempts to promote efficiency in enforcement by minimizing 
the number of parties that must be sued to obtain meaningful 
relief.  This reflects sound policy that avoids waste of private 
and public resources.  And, of course, the exclusive right of a 
patent is of little value without a meaningful remedy for 
infringement. 
In a world of in-home 3D printing, it is the printer of the 
3D product, not the provider or seller of the digital file from 
which the product is printed, who is directly infringing any 
patents directed to the product.  Specifically, the person who 
downloads a CAD file and prints a product on a home 3D 
printer is the person “making” the product for purposes of 
direct infringement.11  The maker or seller of the CAD file, by 
contrast, is not making anything physical, nor are they using,12 
selling,13 or offering to sell14 the patented physical product.  
Thus, they are not direct infringers under Section 271(a). 
The fact that the customers are the manufacturers in this 
scenario reveals how fundamentally in-home 3D printing 
departs from longstanding commercial traditions.  In turn, the 
fact that source of the infringement—the effective provider of 
the entire patented invention—cannot be targeted as a direct 
infringer reveals that the law has not yet caught up to the 
technological reality that physical goods can now be bought 
and sold digitally.15 
In theory, indirect infringement claims might still be able 
 
 11.  While Section 271 does not define “make” or “making,” the Supreme 
Court has stated that “[t]he right to make can scarcely be made plainer by 
definition, and embraces the construction of the thing invented.”  Bauer & Cie v. 
O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913).  
 12.  “The ordinary meaning of ‘use’ is to ‘put into action or service.’ ”  NTP, 
Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
 13.  “[I]n order for there to have been a sale . . . the entire apparatus must 
have been constructed and ready for use.” Ecodyne Corp. v. Croll-Reynolds Eng’g 
Co., 491 F. Supp. 194, 197 (D. Conn. 1979); accord Lang v. Pacific Marine & 
Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  
 14.  “[An] offer [to sell] must be for a potentially infringing article,” i.e., a 
tangible object.  Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk 
Contractors, 617 F.3d 1296, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 15.  For a more detailed discussion of why the provider of a CAD file is not 
directly infringing a product patent under 35 U.S.C. §271(a), see Brean, supra 
note 1, at 783-803. 
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to reach the makers and sellers of CAD files.  But contributory 
infringement, which requires that the item being accused be a 
“component” of the infringing product,16 is not viable because 
CAD files are akin to software in the abstract, which the 
Supreme Court recently held cannot be considered a 
“component” of a computer.17  Like software, a CAD file”might 
be compared to a blueprint (or anything containing design 
information, [e.g., a schematic, template, or prototype]),” but is 
not itself a “component” combinable into a device.18  This leaves 
only active inducement of infringement, which, while 
technically viable, is undesirable because it still has the 
considerable hurdle of proving the requisite scienter discussed 
above.19 
What remains is a gap in patent law that should be filled 
with a way that digital printable products may be patented per 
se.20  Anything less would go against the recognized 
“adaptability of the patent system to new technologies.”21  Now 
that physical goods can be and are designed, developed, 
bought, and sold in digital form, it would disincentivize 
 
 16.  35 U.S.C. § 271(c).  
 17.  Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 449-50 (2007).  
 18.  Id.  
 19.  Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011). 
 20.  See Brean, supra note 1, at 804 (“This state of the law leaves patentees 
virtually helpless to combat a large class of infringement of their product claims. 
If patent law is to continue to encourage innovation, however, Congress or the 
courts must eventually close this gap.”).  Professors Timothy Holbrook and Lucas 
Osborn take a different view, arguing that existing law can close this gap to a 
large degree.  Digital Patent Infringement in an Era of 3D Printing, 48 UC DAVIS 
L. REV. 1319 (2015).  However, the approach taken by Holbrook and Osborn is 
largely policy driven, and parses the various acts of direct infringement under 
Section 271(a) such that some, but not all, would be able to reach CAD files.  
Specifically, they suggest that a “sale” of or “offer[] to sell” a CAD file should be 
actionable because such acts appropriate the “economic value” of the patented 
invention.  Id. at 1356-57. But they conclude that “making” a CAD file should not 
be actionable because it has a less direct economic effect on the patent owner, and 
can lead to undesirable liability for incidental infringers.  Id. at 1385.  Such an 
approach, while very persuasively presented, lacks any statutory support for 
distinguishing whether a CAD file per se may be protected based on the act 
accused of infringing, and would likely require an act of Congress to be 
implemented. 
 21.  In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(“The nation has benefitted from the adaptability of the patent system to new 
technologies, as was recognized in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316, 
206 USPQ 193, 200, 65 L. Ed. 2d 144, 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980) (“Mr. Justice Douglas 
reminded that the inventions most benefiting mankind are those which ‘push 
back the frontiers of chemistry, physics and the like.’ ” )”).  
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designers and developers of 3D-printable products from 
innovating in their spaces if they were placed at a legal 
disadvantage from their more traditional manufacturing 
counterparts.  The patent system must, equally for all kinds of 
innovators, “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts.”22 
Part I of this Article examines whether Beauregard 
claims, which are a well-settled form of patent protection for 
digitally stored instructions, can provide adequate protection 
for 3D printable objects.  Although the use of Beauregard 
claims is found to be permissible for covering instructions for 
printing 3D objects, the legal and technological limitations of 
using Beauregard claims to protect CAD files suggests that the 
improved enforceability of patent rights under this approach is 
marginal.  Part II of this Article explores the feasibility of 
creating a new Beauregard-like claim format to protect CAD 
files per se.   
I. CAN BEAUREGARD CLAIMS PROTECT PHYSIBLES? 
This Part provides an overview of Beauregard claims and 
questions whether such a claiming format can provide 
additional patent protection for 3D-printable objects that will 
adequately bridge the current gap in patent rights for such 
inventions.  Although the short answer is that, yes, 
Beauregard claims can in theory be used to gain broader patent 
scope, the enhanced scope is modest. 
A. An Overview of Beauregard Claims 
In In re Beauregard, the patent applicant drafted claims 
directed to a tangible storage medium (e.g., a floppy disk) 
having a computer program stored on the medium.23  The 
Patent Office rejected the claims based on the printed matter 
doctrine,24 which prohibits patenting printed material where 
there is no “new and unobvious functional relationship 
between the printed matter [i.e., the software code] and the 
substrate [i.e., the disk].”25  While the applicant’s appeal was 
pending, the Patent Office changed its position and held that 
 
 22.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 23.  In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  
 24.  Id. at 1584. 
 25.  In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1983).  
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“computer programs embodied in a tangible medium, such as 
floppy diskettes, are patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 and must be examined under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.”26  
Because there was no longer a case or controversy, the appeal 
was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.27 
Following Beauregard, even though the Federal Circuit 
did not affirmatively endorse the Patent Office’s shift in policy, 
so-called Beauregard claims were widely adopted by patent 
practitioners and remain acceptable for use in patents.  As 
some commentators explained, 
[s]uch claims take the general form: “a computer usable 
medium having computer readable code” or “a computer 
readable medium storing a computer program.” The 
distinguishing feature of this type of claim is that it is for an 
algorithm (the “program code”) fixed in a well-known tangible 
form (the “computer usable medium”). Yet the novelty usually 
lies in the code, not the medium. Large numbers of patent 
claims have been issued in this form, and many more such 
patent applications are pending.28 
Notably, in Beauregard there was apparently nothing 
preventing the applicant from seeking protection on the 
software method itself.  But, as Donald Chisum observes, the 
purpose of seeking distinct protection on the software storage 
medium “seemed to be to convert a potential claim 
for indirect infringement of the method claim (active 
inducement of infringement by others through instruction) 
into an easier to prove claim for direct infringement (sales of a 
patented medium or ‘kit’ with the instructions).”29  Patenting 
the method would make the user of the software the direct 
infringer, but patenting a disk containing the software30 would 
make the seller of the software the direct infringer.31 
The Beauregard application was owned by IBM, a key 
 
 26.  Beauregard, 53 F.3d at 1584.  
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Andrei Iancu & Jeremiah Helm, Code on Disks and Hat Tricks—Is 
Computer Software on a Medium Really Patentable?, 90 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. 
Soc’y 97, 99 (2008).  
 29.  1 Donald S. Chisum, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02[4][d] (2014).  
 30.  When Beauregard was decided in 1995, nearly all software was sold on 
disks because broadband Internet was not yet widely available to consumers to 
download large software files. 
 31.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (proscribing that use and sale of a patented method or 
object, respectively, constitutes direct infringement).   
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player in the electronics and software industry, and was known 
to be a “test case.”32  “In Beauregard, IBM sought to bring 
before the Federal Circuit its idea that algorithms (or software 
inventions, if you prefer) should be claimable in essentially this 
format.”33  The rule of law that IBM sought and the USPTO 
ultimately adopted34 was plainly driven by the idea that, from 
a policy standpoint, software on disk should be patentable 
because otherwise there was no good way to protect against 
unauthorized distribution of software per se.35  As IBM argued, 
“[t]he claim to the floppy disk was needed to facilitate patent 
infringement suits against contributory infringers and 
inducers of infringement of the allowed apparatus and process 
claims. There was no devious purpose to reach anything wider 
or to obtain a broader monopoly than the legitimate monopoly 
of the apparatus and process claims.”36 
Facially, because 3D-printable objects are made by 
instructing a 3D printer, there is no reason that such 
instructions could not be protected by Beauregard-style claims, 
for example: 
A computer readable medium storing computer readable 
instructions which, when acted upon by a 3D printer, cause the 
3D printer to print a widget comprising: 
element A; 
element B; and 
element C disposed between elements A and B. 
This form of claiming, because it does not claim the 
method of printing per se but the storage medium containing 
the printing instructions, avoids some of the enforceability 
issues noted above.  Although one could presumably draft 
acceptable claims of this fashion, the following sub-parts 
address important legal and technological limitations on the 
efficacy of such an approach. 
 
 
 
 32.  Richard H. Stern, An Attempt to Rationalize Floppy Disk Claims, 17 J. 
Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 183, 195 (1998).  
 33.  Id. (emphasis added).  
 34.  Inacu & Helm, supra note 28, at 99; see also Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure, at § 211.05 III (9th ed. 2014) (describing ability to claim invention as 
“a computer-readable medium containing certain programming”) 
 35.  Stern, supra note 32, at 195. 
 36.  Id at n. 64.  
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B. Legal Limitations of Using Beauregard Claims for 3D-
Printable Files 
An important limitation on Beauregard claims is the fact 
that the mere recitation of a “computer readable medium” will 
not automatically avoid a challenge that the claimed invention 
is too abstract to constitute patent-eligible subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.37  This is because “[r]egardless of what 
statutory category (‘process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter,’ 35 U.S.C. § 101) a claim’s language is 
crafted to literally invoke, we look to the underlying invention 
for patent-eligibility purposes.”38 
Beauregard claims involving computer-implemented 
business methods, methods of processing data, etc. are 
increasingly scrutinized for abstractness in the wake of recent 
Supreme Court precedent expounding upon the abstractness 
doctrine.39  To this author’s knowledge, no successful 
abstractness challenge has ever been made to a method of 
manufacturing a particular product.  Indeed, such a challenge 
would surely fail because a manner of constructing a 
specifically-claimed object is undoubtedly limited to a narrow 
physical application of manufacturing abstractions.40 
The more pronounced limitations of Beauregard claims 
(for purposes of this Article) arise from the fact that the 
claimed subject matter is confined to a tangible storage 
medium.  Only certain actions constitute direct infringement 
 
 37.  Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2353–54 (2014) 
(explaining that abstract ideas are not eligible for patent protection).  
 38.  CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011); see also Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360 (holding system claims patent-
ineligible just like method claims because “the system claims are no different 
from the method claims in substance.  The method claims recite the abstract idea 
implemented on a generic computer; the system claims recite a handful of generic 
computer components configured to implement the same idea. This Court has 
long ‘warn[ed] . . . against’ interpreting § 101 in ways that make patent eligibility 
‘depend simply on the draftsman’s art.’”) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 39.  See, e.g., CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (deeming Beauregard claim 
ineligible and discussing Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009)); Alice, 134 S. Ct. 
at 2360 (holding that “[p]etitioner’s claims to a computer system and a computer-
readable medium fail for substantially the same reasons. Petitioner conceded 
below that its media claims rise or fall with its method claims.”)  
 40.  See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (deeming “process 
for molding precision synthetic rubber products” patent eligible, and explaining 
that “[i]ndustrial processes such as this are the types which have historically been 
eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws”).  
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of such claims.  Unlike dealing in actual physical disks, 
“selling” or “offering to sell” a CAD file that a user downloads 
onto his or her own computers is not providing the user with 
any “storage medium.”  Arguably, the CAD file provider is not 
“using” the data on the storage medium because the provider 
is only passively permitting access to the data, not “put[ting] 
[it] into service.”41  At most, the CAD file distributor has 
“made” the claimed invention because the act of storing the 
digital file on the server created the claimed storage medium 
with the claimed data on it.42  This act of infringement is 
enough to potentially warrant an injunction, but injunctions 
are far more difficult to obtain today than they used to be.43  
And because the CAD file need only be placed onto a server 
once to be downloaded countless times, the damages for this 
single infringing act of “making” may not be adequate to 
compensate for the resulting infringement.  Thus, even if a 
Beauregard-style claim is permitted for CAD files, the practical 
effect of enhancing enforceability is modest. 
A claim that is not restricted to a physical storage medium 
might avoid these enforceability issues, but would run into 
different abstractness problems.  As the Federal Circuit 
recently emphasized in Digitech Image Technologies., LLC v. 
Electronics for Imaging, Inc., “[d]ata in its ethereal, non-
physical form is simply information that does not fall under 
any of the categories of eligible subject matter under section 
101.”44  While that case involved pure data that did not, and 
was not intended to, represent a precise 3D physical product, 
 
 41.  NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316–17 (Fed. Cir. 
2005).  
 42.  “The right to make can scarcely be made plainer by definition, and 
embraces the construction of the thing invented.”  Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 
U.S. 1, 10 (1913).  
 43.  eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391–394 (2006) 
(rejecting presumption that injunctive relief is appropriate upon a finding of 
infringement, and holding that “the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive 
relief . . . must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity,” which 
includes consideration of whether the plaintiff “has suffered an irreparable 
injury” and whether “remedies available at law . . . are inadequate to compensate 
for that injury”); see also Daniel Harris Brean, Will the ‘Nexus’ Requirement of 
Apple v. Samsung Preclude Injunctive Relief in the Majority of Patent Cases?, 51 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 153 (2014) (demonstrating that the Federal Circuit’s post-
eBay “nexus” requirement created a substantial new hurdle to injunctive relief 
in cases involving complex or multi-component products). 
 44.  Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 
1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  
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it nonetheless presents a substantial hurdle to patenting 
digital products per se.45 
C. Technological Limitations of Using Beauregard Claims 
for 3D-Printable Files 
Designers work in CAD programs to create CAD files, and 
those CAD files can themselves be used to print objects.46  
Thus, unsurprisingly, the commerce surrounding 3D-printable 
objects appears to be done via CAD files.47 
Instructing a 3D printer to print an object is not quite as 
simple as inputting a CAD file into the printer, however—
there is an important intermediate step where the CAD file is 
converted into a format that the printer can understand and 
use.  The following explanation from 3DPrinting.com provides 
a helpful summary of the process of “slicing” the CAD file into 
many two-dimensional images reflecting the additive printing 
sequence: 
How does 3D Printing work? 
 It all starts with making a virtual design of the object you 
want to create. This virtual design is made in a 
CAD (Computer Aided Design) file using a 3D modeling 
program (for the creation of a totally new object) or with the 
use of a 3D scanner (to copy an existing object). A 3D 
scanner makes a 3D digital copy of an object. 
 To prepare a digital file [created in a 3D modeling 
program] for printing, the 3D modeling software “slices” the 
final model into hundreds or thousands of horizontal layers. 
When the sliced file is uploaded in a 3D printer, the object 
can be created layer by layer. The 3D printer reads every 
slice (or 2D image) and creates the object, blending each 
layer with hardly any visible sign of the layers, with as a 
 
 45.  A representative claim in Digitech was: A device profile for 
describing properties of a device in a digital image reproduction system to 
capture, transform or render an image, said device profile comprising: first data 
for describing a device dependent transformation of color information content of 
the image to a device independent color space; and second data for describing a 
device dependent transformation of spatial information content of the image in 
said device independent color space. Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1349.  
 46.  Brean, supra note 1, at 773-74. 
 47.  See, e.g., SHAPEWAYS, http://www.shapeways.com/tutorials/pre-
print_checklist (last visited July 24, 2015) (allowing customers to upload CAD 
files for printing); THINGIVERSE GROUPS, http://www.thingiverse.com/ (last 
visited July 24, 2015) (website where users can download CAD files of various 
designs).  
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result the three dimensional object.48 
In view of this required slicing process, it appears that 
CAD files arguably do not themselves constitute “instructions” 
to a 3D printer.  This suggests that the CAD files may not 
comprise the kind of computer-readable method steps or 
algorithms that are the subject of typical Beauregard claims.49  
Arguably, CAD files are more akin to mere data, which is 
problematic under cases like Digitech.50 
A sliced CAD file, however, behaves more like the software 
code that provides algorithms and instructions for computers 
and is commonly covered by a Beauregard claim.  To optimally 
protect the digital object in a CAD file using a Beauregard 
claim, it would seemingly be best to somehow claim the sliced 
version of the CAD file rather than the native CAD file itself.  
But the industry does not appear to trade in this format, so 
such a requirement would be disruptive.  And even if the 
industry adapted so that, technologically speaking, 
Beauregard claims were suitable protection for physibles, the 
legal limitations discussed above may more than offset the 
value of the disruption to the industry players. 
*  *  * 
The foregoing analysis shows that what would better 
enhance patent protection for physibles than Beauregard 
claims would be to somehow patent the CAD files per se—
untethered to a digital storage medium and not requiring that 
the files be pre-sliced.  This avoids both the technical and legal 
limitations that prevent Beauregard claims from being more 
effective, as discussed above.  A discussion of the feasibility of 
patenting CAD files per se follows in the next Part. 
II. PATENTING CAD FILES PER SE 
There are two considerable hurdles that stand in the way 
of patenting CAD files per se.  First is the prohibition on claims 
 
 48.  3DPrinting.com, What is 3D Printing?, http://3dprinting.com/what-is-3d-
printing/ (last visited December 30, 2014).  
 49.  Inacu & Helm, supra note 28, at 99 (“Such claims take the general form: 
‘a computer usable medium having computer readable code’ or ‘a computer 
readable medium storing a computer program.’”). 
 50.  Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1349 (“Data in its ethereal, non-physical form is 
simply information that does not fall under any of the categories of eligible subject 
matter under section 101.”). 
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directed to abstract ideas or mere data.51  Second is the 
prohibition on patenting what amounts essentially to mere 
printed matter.52  This Part explains why neither doctrine 
should have absolute preclusive effect as to CAD files for 3D-
printable objects and that, in any event, strong policy concerns 
favor patent protection in this context. 
For purposes of the following discussion, it is proposed 
that a CAD file could be claimed in Beauregard-like sui generis 
fashion in the following exemplary format: 
A digital representation of a physical object printable on a 
3D printer, the object comprising: 
element A; 
element B; and 
element C disposed between elements A and B. 
A. CAD Files for Physibles are Not Merely Abstract Data—
They Are More Akin to Patent-Eligible “Manufactures” 
As noted above, in Digitech, the Federal Circuit held that 
“[d]ata in its ethereal, non-physical form is simply information 
that does not fall under any of the categories of eligible subject 
matter under section 101.”53  The technology at issue in that 
case involved “device profiles” that contained information 
concerning color-related and spatial-related aspects of a digital 
display.54  By referencing and accounting for the information 
in a device profile, the images displayed can be optimized and 
displayed more clearly.55  The claims encompassed: 
A device profile for describing properties of a device in a 
digital image reproduction system to capture, transform or 
render an image, said device profile comprising: 
 first data for describing a device dependent 
transformation of color information content of the image to 
a device independent color space; and  
 second data for describing a device dependent 
transformation of spatial information content of the image 
in said device independent color space.56 
Having started from the premise that “[f]or all categories [of 
 
 51.  Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1349. 
 52.  Gulack, 703 F.2d at 1386. 
 53.  Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1350.  
 54.  Id. at 1347–48.  
 55.  Id.   
 56.  Id. at 1349.  
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patentable subject matter under Section 101]57 except process 
claims, the eligible subject matter must exist in some physical 
or tangible form,”58 the claims were deemed ineligible because 
“[t]he device profile, as claimed, is a collection of intangible 
color and spatial information.”59 
The Federal Circuit’s premise in Digitech is not entirely 
accurate, at least not with respect to the Section 101 class of 
patentable “manufactures.”  The court cited to dictionary 
definitions in In re Nuijten60 (which was relied on in 
Digitech),61 stating that “manufactures” in Section 101 “refers 
to ‘articles’ resulting from the process of manufacture,” and an 
article is “a particular substance or commodity: as, an article of 
merchandise; an article of clothing; salt is a 
necessary article.”62  Nothing in  these definitions requires 
every “manufacture” to be physical, though.  And as Judge 
Linn noted in dissent, the definitions relied on by the majority 
in Nuijten were from an 1895 dictionary, long after the 
“manufacture” language was enacted in the 1700s—language 
that has remained unchanged through the present.63  Looking 
at contemporary definitions from the 1700s, the scope of 
manufacture was much broader, and encompassed “any thing 
made by art,” where “ ‘ art,’ in turn is defined as ‘the power of 
doing something not taught by nature and instinct’; . . . 
‘artfulness, skill, dexterity.’ ” 64  Accordingly, Judge Linn 
concludes: 
it appears that rather than delineate specific, narrow 
categories, Congress has consistently intended statutory 
subject matter to cover the full scope of technological 
ingenuity, however it might best be claimed. Thus, “art” 
and “process[es]” might be viewed, in rough terms, as the 
 
 57.  35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.”).  
 58.  Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1348.  
 59.  Id. at 1350.  
 60.  In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that a 
transitory signal with embedded data was unpatentable despite the fact that the 
claimed signal caused tangible effects—essentially, encoding a discernible 
“watermark” to a signal).  
 61.  Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1350 (discussing the facts of Nuijten and holding 
that “[t]he claims at issue here are even broader than the claim in Nuijten.”). 
 62.  Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1356.  
 63.  Id. at 1360-61 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 64.  Id. at 1361 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
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exercise of technological skill, “manufacture[s]” and 
“composition[s] of matter” as the products of that skill, and 
“machine[s]” as the tools through which that skill is 
exercised.65 
This sentiment is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Diamond v. Chakrabarty that “Congress intended 
statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun 
that is made by man,’ ” 66 but is most likely overbroad in light 
of subsequent Supreme Court abstractness precedent.67 
Nevertheless, a more general and moderate view from 
renowned patent commentator Donald Chisum suggests that 
“manufactures” need not necessarily be tangible.  Chisum 
explains that “manufacture” is a “catch-all” category of 
patentable subject matter: 
which is defined as including all man-made articles except 
machines and compositions of matter.  Under this view, the 
only products excluded from Section 101 are products 
occurring in substantially the same form naturally (not 
‘made by mankind’) and so-called ‘printed matter’ (in which 
the novelty and utility rest other than in the structure of 
the entity). Therefore, the patentability of any man-made 
structural entity should depend on the issues of other 
standards of patentability such as novelty, utility, and 
nonobviousness.68  
While it is fairly easy to see how mere information about a 
digital screen display in Digitech might be a rare exception to 
patent eligibility because the information claimed is 
unconnected to something physical, a CAD file representing a 
complete three-dimensional object is a far cry from such 
disembodied data and can be fairly considered a “man-made 
structural entity.”  The law provides a more than colorable 
 
 65.  Id. at 1362 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 66.  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (U.S. 1980) (quoting S. Rep. 
No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 
6 (1952)).  
 67.  Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354–55 (2014) 
(“[W]e must distinguish between patents that claim the building blocks of human 
ingenuity and those that integrate the building blocks into something more, 
thereby transforming them into a patent-eligible invention. The former would 
risk disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying ideas, and are therefore 
ineligible for patent protection. The latter pose no comparable risk of pre-
emption, and therefore remain eligible for the monopoly granted under our patent 
laws.”).  
 68.  1 Donald S. Chisum, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02 (2014).  
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basis for printable CAD files to be treated as patent-eligible 
manufactures. 
Returning to the issue of abstractness, aside from the 
statutory text of Section 101, the key reason to treat certain 
kinds of claims as unpatentably abstract is due to concerns 
about preemption.  Specifically, “no one can patent . . . abstract 
ideas” because “[t]hese are the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work, and therefore, if patented, would stifle the 
very progress that Congress is authorized to promote.”69  The 
kinds of abstract ideas that have recently been deemed 
impermissibly abstract by the Supreme Court were 
characterized as “fundamental economic practice[s]” and 
“building block[s] of the modern economy.”70 
Patenting a CAD file drawn to a specific structural object 
preempts the technological field no more than a patent on the 
actual physical object itself—i.e., hardly at all.  Specifically-
claimed objects are not “basic tools” but completed products, so 
there is no preemption concern that should tip the scale 
against finding CAD files to be non-abstract, patent-eligible 
manufactures. 
Compared to the  cases such as Digitech and Nuijten, 
which involve essentially pure data untethered to any specific 
device or object, a CAD file is remarkably concrete.  A CAD file 
is intended to be precise, detailed, and suitable for use in 
tooling and manufacturing—it is not an abstraction of an 
object but an accurate representation of it. 
For reasoning much like the foregoing, the International 
Trade Commission recently held that “digital datasets . . . 
representing the initial, intermediate, and final positions of 
patients’ teeth for use in fabricating dental appliances for 
orthodontic treatment of individual patients” qualified as 
“articles” that could be prevented from importation if they 
infringed a U.S. patent.71  The accused data sets were created 
in Pakistan, transmitted electronically to a computer in Texas, 
and printed on a 3D printer to make a physical model.72  In 
 
 69.  Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 649 (2010).  
 70.  Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356.  
 71.  Certain Digital Models, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, USITC (Apr. 10, 2014) 
(Commission Opinion) at 34. Infringing “articles” can be excluded from entry into 
the U.S. under 19 U.S.C. § 1337.  
 72.  Certain Digital Models, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, USITC (Apr. 10, 2014) 
(Commission Opinion) at 17. 
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finding such data sets to be non-abstract articles, the ITC 
distinguished the patient-specific set of teeth data with mere 
“information in the abstract.”73  The ITC also noted the breadth 
of the statutory term “articles,” which “appears to broadly 
cover infringing imports, without express limitation as to form 
or type,” as well as Supreme Court precedent treating digital 
files as “articles of commerce” in other contexts.74  Ultimately, 
the ITC concluded that the data sets were “true articles of 
international commerce” largely on policy grounds, because 
“an interpretation of ‘articles’ that allows the Commission to 
reach the imported physical aligners . . . but does not include 
the infringing digital data sets from which the aligners are 
produced, simply because they are in digital form, is 
unreasonable and inconsistent with the purpose of the 
statute.”75 
To the extent there remains some question of whether, 
doctrinally speaking, CAD files can be considered 
“manufactures,” it should be emphasized that “[t]hese terms 
[in Section 101] may not be read in a strict literal sense entirely 
divorced from the context of the patent law.”76  When Section 
101 is construed in a manner mindful of the innovation-
encouraging purpose of patent law as a whole, designing new 
products in CAD programs that represent real-world printable 
objects should not be excluded from protectability at the 
threshold, as discussed infra. Indeed, as the Federal Circuit 
has explained, “[r]egardless of what statutory category 
(‘process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,’ 35 
U.S.C. § 101) a claim’s language is crafted to literally invoke, 
we look to the underlying invention for patent-eligibility 
purposes.”77  Here, the underlying invention of a printable 
CAD file is the physical printed object. 
 
 
 
 73.  Id. at 49–50 (discussing Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 
1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that “knowledge that a substance possesses 
a particular quality” is not an “article” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g))  
 74.  Id. at 38, 40–42.  
 75.  Id. at 53–55.  
 76.  In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Archer, J., concurring-
in-part and dissenting-in-part).  
 77.  CyberSource Corp v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
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B. CAD Files for Physibles Do Not Violate the Printed  
Matter Doctrine 
A CAD file is essentially a three-dimensional picture 
drawn digitally and can be considered analogous to 
unpatentable “printed matter.”  Whether something should be 
treated as printed matter turns on whether “a significant or 
the sole difference between the claimed subject matter and the 
prior art lies in the content of the information” in relation to 
the substrate.78  Generally, the mere arrangement of 
information, symbols, or text on a substrate is simply not 
considered inventive and worthy of patent protection.79 
The policy behind the printed matter doctrine is closely 
related to the prohibition against abstract ideas and mere 
mental steps being patented.  As Chisum explains, 
“[i]ntroduction of a printed matter or symbolic element into a 
claim for a patent often calls for human mental interpretation 
or participation and hence brings the mental steps doctrine 
into play.”80  For this reason, the Federal Circuit noted an 
exception in In re Lowry for situations where “the information 
[is] processed not by the mind but by a machine, the 
computer.”81  The source code claims in Beauregard certainly 
fit into this exception, as do CAD files which, by definition, are 
digital files read and interpreted by a computer in order to be 
understandable to humans. 
C. Sound Public Policy Favors Protecting Printable         
CAD Files 
The current technological reality is that many designers 
work largely, and sometimes entirely, in CAD programs.82  
 
 78.  1 Donald S. Chisum, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02(4) (2014).  
 79.  In re Miller, 57 C.C.P.A. 809, 812 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (“In this instance the 
claimed indicia and legend, being merely placed on the claimed structure in any 
desired location and manner, do not produce the required cooperative structural 
relationship necessary before the printed matter can be given patentable 
weight.”); In re Russell, 18 C.C.P.A. 1184, 1185 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (“The mere 
arrangement of printed matter on a sheet or sheets of paper, in book form or 
otherwise,” is not patentable.). 
 80.  1 Donald S. Chisum, CHISUM ON PATENTS  § 1.02(4)(e).  
 81.  In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (explaining that “[t]he 
printed matter cases ‘dealt with claims defining as the invention certain novel 
arrangements of printed lines or characters, useful and intelligible only to the 
human mind.’ In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399 (CCPA 1969)”).  
 82.  See Brean, supra note 1, at 773-74. 
2015] 3D PRINTING & PATENTING PHYSIBLES 855 
CAD files are a major madium, if not the prevailing medium, 
for industrial design work and also of 3D-printing commercial 
activity.83  In order for the patent system to “promote the 
Progress of . . . useful Arts,” it should reflect these realities.84 
As Judge Newman has noted, “[t]he nation has benefitted 
from the adaptability of the patent system to new 
technologies.”85  To credit an invention designed and sold in the 
real world but not the same invention designed and sold 
digitally draws a distinction without a difference.  The patent 
system should not discourage innovation merely because of the 
design tools utilized.  As Section 103 of the Patent Act 
concerning obviousness has long proscribed, “patentability 
shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention 
was made.”86 
Mark Lemley recently published an article that suggests 
we should not be too quick to enhance patent protection in 
response to 3D printing.87  In the article, Lemley compares 
Internet piracy of copyrighted works to the piracy concerns 
raised by 3D printing technology, and explores whether 
enforcement of IP rights in both contexts serve their 
innovation-encouraging purposes.88  He shows that as the cost 
of production and distribution of copyrightable works 
decreased (with the advent of personal computers and the 
Internet), counter to traditional IP theory, creativity was not 
stifled but flourished.  Lemley ultimately concludes that, over 
time, 3D printing technology will likewise encourage 
innovation in the absence of IP to the point that IP rights may 
someday become unnecessary to further technological 
progress.89  Lemley’s analysis is thought-provoking, but 
 
 83.  Id.   
 84.  U.S. Const. art I., § 8., cl. 8.  
 85.  In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting) 
(noting that this point “was recognized in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 
316 (1980) (“Mr. Justice Douglas reminded that the inventions most benefiting 
mankind are those which ‘push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics and the 
like.’”)).  
 86.  35 U.S.C. § 103.  
 87.  See Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 NYU L. Rev. 460 
(2015). 
 88.  Id. at 507-08 (“Incumbent industries are always threatened by new 
technologies and they often turn to regulation to create barriers to those 
technologies in order to protect the old way of doing thing. IP owners will do the 
same thing.”).  
 89.  Id. at 515. 
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although his point might be true for music, movies, etc. and the 
Internet, it would be premature to conclude that 3D printing is 
anywhere near the same point or that strong utility patent 
rights are no longer necessary. 
Lemley first notes the Internet was originally viewed by 
copyright owners as a piracy-facilitating evil that would 
discourage artists and authors from creating their music, 
movies, books, etc. by removing financial incentives.90  Those 
copyright owners “responded just as IP theory said they 
should”: 
They persuaded Congress to pass a multitude of new laws, 
criminalizing copyright infringement on the Internet even 
if done for no financial gain and ramping up the penalties 
for copyright infringement to an extreme degree. They filed 
tens of thousands of lawsuits against people who posted 
copyrighted content online. They sued anyone with even a 
vague connection to the pirates . . . .91 
These aggressive enforcement efforts were ineffective.92  
Copyright infringement on the Internet is still rampant, and 
yet the amount of new artistic content being created is higher 
than ever.93  A lot of quality content is even generated for the 
purpose of giving it away for free over the Internet.94 
Lemley attributes the phenomenon of mass creative 
activity in the face of minimal or no underlying IP incentives 
to several factors, including: (1) that the ease of copying and 
distributing content over the Internet facilitates legitimate 
reproduction and distribution every bit as much as it does 
piracy, lowering and even eliminating barriers to entry on the 
publishing end; (2) that the technology needed for generating 
quality music and movies at home emerged along with the 
Internet and lowered production costs considerably; and (3) 
that the presence of people using these tools to create inspires 
 
 90.  Id. at 482-83 (“Consistent with IP theory, as the cost of reproduction and 
distribution dropped to zero, piracy became rampant on the Internet. The 
companies that produced content in the pre-Internet world worried that they 
could not make money in an environment where copying was so easy.”).  
 91.  Id. at 483.  
 92.  Id. at 484.  
 93.  Id. at 485. Lemley notes that “economic scholarship suggests” the new 
music is “at least as high quality as before the Internet.” Id. at 485. The relative 
quality of music is obviously highly subjective. 
 94.  Id. at 487.  
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creativity by others.95  And, more fundamentally, Lemley 
posits that “it may simply be that IP theory is wrong about 
what motivates people to create.”96  Inspiration, competition, 
problem-solving, attribution, and recognition have been shown 
to be at least as motivating, and in many cases more 
motivating, than money.97 
Lemley concedes that some kinds of creative works cannot 
flourish in the absence of IP rights—namely, big budget movies 
and video games, where the cost of creation remains very high 
and thus it is more important to be able to recoup one’s 
investment.98  A nuanced balancing act is therefore required to 
ensure that the law “protect[s] those exceptional works without 
blocking the creativity that is happening despite, not because 
of, IP.”99  The problem is that trying to target the facilitators of 
harmful infringement (e.g., shutting down peer-to-peer file 
sharing services) carries the risk of “killing off what is good 
about the Internet” in the process.100 
According to Lemley, 3D printing will likely endure the 
same trials and face the same challenges.  Initially, 
“[p]rofessional industrial design firms will resist having their 
works ‘Napsterized’ because they fear losing control over who 
can use their design and not getting paid when people do.”101  I 
agree with Lemley that the solution to those design firms’ 
legitimate concerns is certainly not to shut down or overly 
regulate the sale of 3D printers because the “social value in [3D 
printing] technolog[y], like the Internet, is enormous.”102  Like 
the Internet, 3D printing technology will reduce production 
and distribution costs in manufacturing like never before, and 
will in turn give rise to a new generation of designers and 
manufacturers that, while disruptive to industries, will be for 
the good of the society in the form of better, cheaper, and/or 
more environmentally-friendly products.103 
But we are not there yet.  While laptops and the Internet 
 
 95.  Lemley, supra note 87, at 487-95.  
 96.  Id. at 493.  
 97.  Id. at 463, 493.  
 98.  Id. at 496.   
 99.  Id. at 496.  
 100.  Id. at 462, 500.  
 101.  Lemley, supra note 87, at 498.  
 102.  Id. at 500-01. The advent of 3D-printed guns, for example, have caught 
the attention of lawmakers.  Id. at 500.   
 103.  Id. at 58–59.  
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allowed anybody with a guitar to record and distribute 
copyrightable songs on an unprecedented scale, productive use 
of 3D printing technology outside of the industrial 
manufacturing context is in its infancy and likely will be for a 
while.104  Most people can learn to play a song on a guitar in a 
time that is de minimis compared to the time needed to learn 
to use a CAD program to design a patentable utilitarian device.  
The amount of specialized knowledge, research, and 
development involved in designing a new engine part, 
consumer electronic, or robot, for example, tends to be quite 
substantial.  And these examples are not on par with the big-
budget movie and video game “exceptions” noted by Lemley 
where IP rights are still vital for copyrightable works105—they 
represent typical subject matter for utility patents.  Indeed, in 
2013 the top fifty recipients of utility patents in the United 
States were almost exclusively household-name consumer 
electronics, software, automotive, and telecommunications 
companies.106  To the extent 3D printing brings engineering 
and product design to the masses, it is not likely to be 
patentable utilitarian engineering on a large scale any time 
soon.  Inventions are not patentable unless useful, novel, and 
nonobvious,107 whereas all that is required for copyrightability 
is originality—a very low threshold requiring only a modicum 
of investment.108 
Lemley ultimately suggests that “[i]t may be that we 
simply do not need IP protection when both the cost of creation 
and the cost of distribution fall below a certain point.”109  While 
in the copyright context I am inclined to agree that “creation 
that relies on IP is likely to play a less and less significant role 
in a post-scarcity world,”110 the realm of utility patent subject 
 
 104.  See Brean, supra note 1, at 774-81. 
 105.  Lemley, supra note 87, at 506. 
 106.  See USPTO, Patenting By Organizations (Utility Patents), Part B1-1–B1-
2 (2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo
_13.pdf. The top ten companies were, in order, IBM, Samsung, Canon, Sony, 
Microsoft, Panasonic, Toshiba, Qualcomm, LG, and Google.  Id.  
 107.  35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103.  
 108.  17 U.S.C. § 102; Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
345 (1991) (“To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a 
slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, 
as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ it 
might be.”).  
 109.  Lemley, supra note 87, at 50.   
 110.  Lemley, supra note 87 at 48. The reference to “post-scarcity” refers to a 
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matter in many technology sectors is still well above the cost 
threshold where the value of IP might diminish.111  The 
distribution costs may fall across most sectors thanks to 3D 
printing, but the cost of creation may differ considerably 
depending on the technology.  Robotics, for example, might see 
a tremendous reduction in the cost of development and 
prototyping, while consumer electronics probably will not.  The 
same is true for artistic works—as Lemley notes, while music 
recording is cheaper than ever, the cost of creating big-budget 
movies may never decrease even though the distribution cost 
is much smaller now due to the Internet.112 
The day may come when the tools needed to create and 
distribute most 3D-printable inventions are so sophisticated 
and user-friendly that amateurs will easily and routinely 
create patentable innovations across many industries.113  But 
that day does not appear to even be on the horizon at this point 
in time, and the prospect does not warrant declining to protect 
the related IP now, while we could be fanning the flames of this 
emerging technology with appropriate patent protection.  
Indeed, maintaining meaningful patent protection after 
crossing a new technological frontier is exactly what Judge 
Newman had in mind when praising the adaptability and 
success of the patent system.114 
On the other hand, Lemley concludes that, based on the 
lessons we can learn from the copyright content industry’s 
response to the Internet, “we should resist the tendency to 
expand IP reflexively to meet every new technological 
challenge.”115  This is a sound principle, but perhaps one with 
broader applicability to artistic, rather than technological, 
 
world where goods are all dig,ital or traded as disembodied information.  As 
Lemley explains, the advent of the Internet and 3D printing has made it sko that 
“[e]xisting content is no longer scarce. Once created, it costs virtually nothing to 
reproduce, and anyone can copy and distribute it.” Id. at 12.  
 111.  Id. at 50–51.  
 112.  Id. at 506.   
 113.  Id. at 487-89.  
 114. Judge Newman’s above quotation referenced Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. 303 (1980). See supra note 65.  Had the Court in Chakrabarty decided 
not to deem genetically-engineered bacteria patent-eligible, arguably that entire 
industry would have collapsed from lack of up-front investment.  
 115.  Lemley, supra note 87, at 52 (“Incumbent industries are always 
threatened by new technologies and they often turn to regulation to create 
barriers to those technologies in order to protect the old way of doing thing. IP 
owners will do the same thing.”).  
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innovation.  Working on cutting-edge technology to push 
technological boundaries often requires utilizing the most 
current tools and state-of-the-art equipment.  This tends to 
require a substantial up-front investment that might not 
happen as often absent the monetary incentives IP can 
provide.  Put another way, being too far behind on our IP laws 
might lead to technological complacency that stalls innovation.  
Some will continue to rely on older tools to innovate, but most 
technological innovation does not come from using outdated 
tools.  Maintaining strong IP rights for inventions made using 
the newest tools promotes technological progress by 
encouraging adoption of, and improvement upon, the latest 
technologies. 
Patenting physibles will allow inventions to be protected 
to the same extent, in substance, regardless of whether the 
inventive and distributive medium is physical or digital.  To 
the extent IP protection for physical utilitarian objects remains 
valuable for encouraging technological innovation (and I 
believe it does), the same is true for physibles.  But there is a 
gap in the law that precludes protecting these two versions of 
the same thing with the same scope of protection.  This gap 
should be closed just like other areas where the form of patent 
claims tends to be exalted over the claims’ substance.116 
Even the Supreme Court’s recent Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank 
case, which took a broad view of unpatentably abstract 
computerized inventions, treats claims on their substantive 
merit rather than their style, and considered method, system, 
and computer-readable medium claims all to be directed to 
essentially the same invention.117  Alice would therefore 
support the treatment of physical product and corresponding 
CAD claims as both equally eligible for patent protection. 
1. Safe Harbor for Incidental Infringers 
Protecting CAD files against unauthorized sales over the 
Internet is in keeping with, and essentially co-extensive with, 
patent protection for product claims as asserted against 
traditional manufacturers.  Admittedly, however, patenting 
 
 116.  See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357 
(2014) (“A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ 
to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize 
the [abstract idea].’ ” ).  
 117.  Id. at 2360.  
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CAD files for physibles will allow for some modest incidental 
infringement to be actionable that is currently immunized.  For 
example, one who merely downloads or makes available for 
download a CAD file would arguably be infringing a CAD-file 
claim by “making” the patented invention, but would not 
infringe a physical product claim.  To the extent this occurs 
over a peer-to-peer network or on a CAD file sharing service 
such as Thingiverse,118 widespread enforcement against end-
users, peer-to-peer software providers, or proprietors of user-
generated online CAD file repositories risks “killing off” what 
is good about 3D printing in the process.119 
Enforcement against end-users who merely download a 
CAD file (or possess it and make it available via a peer-to-peer 
network) is highly unlikely because such de minimis 
infringement, while actionable, results in little to no 
recoverable damages or other remedies that would make 
enforcement worthwhile.120  Should those end-users proceed to 
“use” the CAD file to make and sell a similar competing CAD 
file, a more legitimate claim of infringement can be made.121 
The trickier issues surround peer-to-peer network 
providers and user-generated CAD file repositories because 
direct infringement is a strict liability tort, and there is no safe 
harbor for unknowingly infringing.122  To some extent this 
concern is offset again by the likelihood that much of the 
infringement will be de minimis (e.g., a single “making” when 
the CAD file is stored on a server) and lead to nominal 
damages, if any.  But injunctive relief—having the file 
removed—is often going to be much more desirable to 
patentees in this situation anyway.  For peer-to-peer network 
providers, the problem is a non-issue because merely providing 
software that can be used for sharing CAD files would not 
 
 118.  THINGIVERSE GROUPS , www.thingiverse.com (last visited July 25, 
2015).  
 119.  Lemley, supra note 87,. at 3, 41–42.  
 120.  Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(Rader, J., concurring) (“[T]he statute leaves no leeway to excuse infringement 
because the infringer only infringed a little. Rather, the statute accommodates 
concerns about de minimis infringement in damages calculations.”).  
 121.  See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (explaining that the “use” of an invention occurs when it is “put into 
service”) 
 122.  See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 n.2 
(2011). 
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constitute direct infringement under Section 271(a).123  
Perhaps a claim can be made for active inducement or 
contributory infringement, but such claims are rarely 
appropriate due to the requirement that the indirect infringer 
possess specific intent to cause infringement (which makes 
such theories undesirable to patentees anyway). 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that indirect infringement 
claims can be made against peer-to-peer networks, user 
repositories, and individual users now, in the absence of CAD 
file patent protection, and thus provide a valuable tool for 
combating infringement with respect to the more egregious 
and obviously intentional indirect infringement (a la Napster). 
Those who merely host or transmit CAD files representing 
patented objects, without knowing that the files are infringing, 
however, should be immunized from indirect infringement 
liability whether the CAD files are parented per se or not. For 
the same reason, those who inadvertently designed a CAD file 
similar to a patented object (or CAD file) would not be liable 
for indirect infringement either. 
For the user-generated CAD file repositories like 
Thingiverse, in addition to the foregoing, another market-
based solution is available—make contributors assume the 
risk and responsibility for their CAD files, including any 
intellectual property infringement, and reserve the right to 
remove any infringing content.124  Similar contractual 
protections are in place for incidental infringers already, such 
as when retailers and re-sellers, who would otherwise be 
responsible for infringement, insist on indemnity from their 
respective manufacturers and product suppliers.125 
Finally, should the above limitations on incidental 
infringement liability prove to be inadequate in deterring 
harmful litigious patentees, it would be advisable to adopt a 
statutory safe harbor for those who merely host or relay CAD 
 
 123.  See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (explaining that the “use” of an invention occurs when it is “put into 
service”); MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932 (2005) 
(explaining that peer-to-peer programs do not directly infringe per se because 
they have legitimate non-infringing uses). 
 124.  THINGIVERSE GROUPS,  http://www.thingiverse.com/legal (last 
visited July 24, 2015).  
 125.  See, e.g., Speedtrack, Inc. v. Office Depot, Inc., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 
11169 (Fed. Cir. June 30, 2015) (case involving various online retailers that had 
been indemnified by their software vendor) 
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files, much like was implemented with the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”). In the closely analogous context of 
distributing copyrighted content on the Internet, the DMCA 
provides that the passive transmission or routing of 
copyrighted material by an online service provider, as well as 
the storage of such material at the direction of a user, is not 
actionable if the service provider lacks knowledge of the 
infringing nature of the material and agrees to take down the 
content upon receiving a valid notice from the copyright 
owner.126  Similar protections are equally sensible in the 
patented CAD file context to avoid the potential for harmful 
incidental infringement assertions.127 
CONCLUSION 
Designers of 3D-printable products are currently at a 
disadvantage concerning the enforceability of patent rights in 
their inventions.  To combat infringement, it is necessary to 
have an effective way to extinguish infringement at the 
source—in this case, where the CAD files are being sold or 
distributed.  The law does not currently provide such designers 
with patent protection allowing for adequate remedies against 
such entities. This discourages innovation in the emerging 3D-
printing space. Absent a way to patent the printable CAD files 
per se, the enforceability against 3D-printing infringement will 
remain severely limited. 
Beauregard claims are perhaps the best existing option for 
patents that might encompass CAD files, but even Beauregard 
claims cannot overcome many of the legal and technical 
limitations on protection.  At best, Beauregard claims might 
provide some small additional scope of enforceability that still 
 
 126.  17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (c). 
 127.  In fact, although outside the scope of this paper, at least some expressive 
and non-utilitarian portions of a CAD file may already be protectable under 
copyright and subject to the DMCA, thus making it a useful additional layer of 
protection for patentees to consider.  Only actual copying of such non-utilitarian 
features within the CAD file (e.g., stylistic choices and original designs), and not 
coincidental similarity, would be actionable under copyright, but such protection 
is still useful against blatant copying done without any effort to change the file 
or “design around” it.  For a further discussion of the potential use of copyright 
for protecting CAD files, see my prior article.  Brean, supra note 1, at 807-813 
(explaining that copyright protection may be feasible for CAD files, but that 
important limitations may render the protection useful only “to the extent that 
the value of a product stems from its form, not from its function”). 
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does not come close to putting 3D-printable inventions on the 
same footing with other kinds of inventions. 
But it should be remembered that Beauregard was a “test 
case.”  Beauregard changed the law because IBM pushed for 
broader protection with a form of claiming that the law did not 
currently recognize, and the USPTO was ultimately convinced 
to change its policy to allow such claiming.  That policy shift 
considerably expanded the scope of protection available for 
software. 
A similar test case for CAD files using a claim of the form 
proposed herein could have the same effect.  But whether 
through a USPTO policy shift, a doctrinal development in the 
courts, or a statutory amendment, the future of patent 
protection for 3D-printable products hinges on stakeholders 
pushing for patent claims that are commensurate in scope with 
their inventions.  3D printing is the next big step into the 
digital millennium, and the patent system should jettison the 
obsolete notion that all product inventions are physical. 
 
